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1 Question 1.
Suppose Yt = F (Kt, AtLt), with F (·) having constant returns to scale and the intensive form of
the production function satisfying the Inada conditions. Suppose also that At+1 = (1 + g)At,
Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt, Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + sYt.
1. Derive the dynamics of the economy. Does the economy have a global equilibrium and a
balanced growth path?
2. Assume the production function is Cobb-Douglas and derive the value of k? on the balanced
growth path.
2 Question 2.
Derive the Diamond Model:
1. Outline the assumptions of the Diamond model;
2. Derive the dynamics of the economy assuming logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function. Then, discuss the issues that arise if we relax such assumptions;
3. Describe how each of the following affects kt+1 as a function of kt:
(a) A rise in n;
(b) A downward shift of the production function;
(c) A rise in α;
(d) A fall in ρ;
(e) A positive depreciation rate δ.
4. Discuss the issue of dynamic inefficiency in the Diamond model.
1
2 4 QUESTION 4 (OPTIONAL).
3 Question 3.
Consider a Diamond economy where g = 0, production is Cobb-Douglas and utility is logarithmic.
1. Suppose government taxes each young individual an amount τ and uses the proceeds to
pay benefits to old individuals (each old person receives (1 + n)τ .
(a) How, if at all, does this change affect the dynamics of capital and the equilibrium
value of k??
(b) (Optional) How does a marginal increase in τ affect the welfare of current and future
generations if the economy is initially on a balanced growth path that is dynamically
efficient?
2. Suppose the government taxes each young person an amount τ and uses the proceeds to
purchase capital. Individuals born at t therefore receive (1− rt+1)τ when they are old.
(a) How, if at all, does this change affect the dynamics of capital and the equilibrium
value of k??
4 Question 4 (Optional).
Suppose, as in the Diamond model, that Lt two-period-lived individuals are born at t and
that Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt. For simplicity, let utility be logarithmic with no discounting: Ut =
lnC1,t + lnC2,t+1. Each individual born at time t is endowed with A units of the economy’s
single good, which can be either consumed or stored. Each unit stored yields x > 0 units of the
good in the following period. Finally, assume that in the initial period t = 0, in addition to the
L0 young individuals, each endowed with A units of good, there are [1/(1 + n)]L0 individuals
who are alive only in t = 0. Each of these “old”is endowed with some amount Z of the good;
their utility is simply their consumption in the initial period, C2,0
1. Describe the decentralised equilibrium of this economy.
2. There are two ways in which the Diamond and Samuelson models differ from textbook
models. First, market are incomplete: since individual cannot trade with individuals who
have not yet been born, some possible transactions are ruled out. Second, because the time
goes on forever, there are an infinite number of agents. The problem asks you to investigate
which of these is the source of the possibility of dynamic inefficiency. For simplicity, assume
log utility, no discounting, n = 0 and 0 < x < 1.
(a) Incomplete markets. Suppose we eliminate incomplete markets from the model by
allowing all agents to trade in a competitive market “before”the beginning of time.
That is, a Walrasian auctioneer calls out prices Qt for the good at each date. Indi-
viduals can then make sales and purchases at these prices given their endowment and
their ability to store. The budget constraint of an individual born at t is thus
QtC1,t +Qt+1C2,t+1 = Qt(A− St) +Qt+1Stx, (1)
where 0 ≤ St ≤ A is the amount the individual stores.
i. Suppose the auctioneer announces Qt+1 = Qt/x for all t > 0. Show that in
this case individuals are indifferent concerning how much to store, and that the
equilibrium is the same as in exercise (4.1.).
3ii. Suppose the auctioneer announces prices that fails to satisfy Qt+1 = Qt/x at
some date. Show that at the first date that does not satisfy this condition the
market for the good cannot clear, and thus that the proposed price path cannot
be an equilibrium.
(b) Infinite duration. Suppose that the economy ends at some date T . That is, suppose
that individuals born at T live only one period (and hence seek to maximise C1,T ),
and that thereafter no individuals are born.
i. Show that the decentralised equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.
(c) What is, then, the source of dynamic inefficiency?
